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INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the impact, effectiveness and legitimacy of a counter-terrorist measure or a 
collection of measures requires an appreciation of the operational perspective, i.e. the perspective 
of those entities, individuals and institutions that are tasked with putting these measures and 
policies into effect. As outlined in D2.1, 88 of the counter-terrorist measures introduced by the EU 
since 2001 are ‘hard’ legal measures, many of which require legal incorporation in the member 
states; the implementation of the remainder required a mixture of different actions to be taken not 
only by the civil and military actors of member states, and European institutions such as 
EUROPOL, but also in some cases by private entities such as banks, universities and 
corporations. In each case the process of giving effect to the EU measure is one of what we can 
term operationalisation. 
Operationalisation is a process by which abstract or imprecise commitments, principles, measures 
and policies are translated into ‘on the ground’ action. As a process it can be characterised as 
having three core elements: (1) the translation into concrete measures, steps and commitments of 
abstract policies, principles and obligations; (2) the execution of these concrete measures, steps 
and commitments, and (3) the measurement of the implications of executing these measures, 
steps and commitments (often considered by reference to multiple forms of measurement). 
Operationalisation then has three core elements: translation, execution and measurement. This 
report uses the particular example of the operationalisation of COM(2009)538 (Towards the 
integration of maritime surveillance: A common information sharing environment for the EU 
maritime domain) by the Irish Naval Service in order to illustrate these three elements of the 
operationalisation of EU counter-terrorism. This approach allows for preliminary conclusions on the 
meaning of impact, legitimacy and effectiveness from an operational perspective to be drawn. 
Understanding the operational terrain in EU counter-terrorism is also important. Not only has the 
EU’s counter-terrorist infrastructure not yet been comprehensively mapped, but the threat from 
terrorism and the commitment to counter-terrorism within the EU remain strong; the threat is 
constantly evolving from ‘structured groups and networks to smaller EU-based groups and solo 
terrorists or lone actors’.1  According to the TE-SAT report for that year, 17 people died as a result 
of terrorist attacks in Europe in 2012 and 219 terrorist attacks were carried out in the EU, leading to 
the arrest of 537 individuals for terrorist related offences. This report first outlines what is meant by 
the operational perspective, before focusing on the nature of the EU counter-terrorist infrastructure 
including the agencies and entities within the EU that are involved in operationalisation and 
considering the maritime surveillance case study mentioned above. Working definitions of impact, 
legitimacy and effectiveness are then drawn from this and outlined in the closing section. 
UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
In this report we conceive of the operational perspective as relating to the perspectives and 
experiences of all actors that are involved in the process of operationalising EU counter-terrorism 
measures, broadly understood. At its widest level, operationalisation can be defined as ‘the 
process of translating theoretical concepts into more practical and observable or measureable 
forms’.2 In the context of EU counter-terrorism this definition captures all entities that are involved 
in the translation of an EU counter-terrorist measure (which include measures that are in some 
cases somewhat vague commitments to ‘counter’, for example, radicalisation or to enhance social 
cohesion) into actionable commitments that can be observed or measured. This can involve not 
only European institutions (as outlined below), but also actors operating at the member state level 
including but not limited to border agencies, police, military, aviation authorities, banks, 
corporations, and police forces. These actors are involved in progressing the measure from its 
original articulation into its practical form, in assessing the operation of the measure (including in 
                                                             
1
 Europol, TE-SAT 2013 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. 
2
  Jonker, J and Pennink, BJW The Essence of Research Methodology: A Concise Guide for Master and PhD Students 
in Management Science (Springer-Verlag 2010), at 51. 
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determining what benchmarks would be used to measure it again), and in some cases in proposing 
reforms and revisions. Analysis of the ways in which these stages of operationalisation take place 
allows us to discern some key insights into the operational perceptions of impact, legitimacy and 
effectiveness. 
In the EU counter-terrorist context, operationalisation is one part of a longer cycle of events and 
stages that largely comprise of the identification of a problem and making of policy to address it 
(addressed in the democratic report3), the implementation of the measure with implications for both 
implementers themselves (addressed in this report) and society (addressed in the societal report4), 
and finally (where appropriate) the legalisation of these approaches either through legislative 
change or through legal review of the measure and its implementation (addressed in the legal 
report5). Within this ‘life cycle’ of EU counter-terrorism measures , the operationalisation and 
legalisation elements can be characterised as a period of what Dubin terms empirical verification, 
i.e. a phase of developing propositions or logical deductions that could be made from the theory, 
developing empirical indicators, generating hypotheses, and testing.6  
Understanding and appreciating the operational perspective on the impact, legitimacy and 
effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism measures is vital to the articulation of a methodologically 
sound understanding of these three concepts. This is because these measures have critical 
implications for operational actors within the overall scheme. These operational actors are often 
acting on the national rather than the European level. In such circumstances they are not 
European institutions; rather, they are domestic institutions and agencies, or transnational 
corporations acting at a domestic level, which are tasked with actually giving effect to a state’s 
obligations under EU law and as part of EU policy. Thus, while the report outlines the institutional 
architecture of the EU in order to illustrate the context in which EU policy is made, it places an 
operational focus on the national level through a case study approach.   
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF EU COUNTER-TERRORISM 
SECILE is concerned with the creation, implementation and review of counter-terrorism measures 
emanating from the European Union. Although a large portion of the operationalisation of EU 
counter-terrorism occurs on the national level—which is the focus of the case study in this report—
an understanding of the operation of EU counter-terrorism infrastructures and, in particular, of the 
institutional structure of the EU as it relates to counter-terrorism is important. This section of the 
report aims to provide this by concentrating, within an EU institutional context, on the following 
questions. Who proposes EU counter-terrorism legislation? Who adopts it? Who makes the 
decisions regarding legislation? What groups contribute to this decision-making process? Who 
oversees the implementation of the legislation? In this way it attempts to penetrate the institutional 
complexity that is the EU security architecture and provide an accessible overview of the existing 
actors and their roles. It does so by outlining the institutional framework for countering terrorism 
within the general EU structure of European Commission, European Council, and European 
Parliament. 
1. European Commission 
The European Commission is the executive arm of the EU and acts as 'the driving force' within the 
EU's institutional system.7 It is responsible for proposing legislation, policies and programmes of 
                                                             
3
 Chistyakova,Y,  “Report on Democratic Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in Counter-Terrorism”, 
Deliverable 3.6, SECILE. Available at www.secile.eu  
4
 Martin-Mazé, M, “Report on Societal Understandings of Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in Counter-Terrorism”, 
Deliverable 3.5, SECILE. Available at www.secile.eu  
5
 Vermeulen, M.,  Deering, D., & McCarthy, S., “Report on Legal Understandings of Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness 
in Counter-Terrorism”, Deliverable 3.3, SECILE. Available at www.secile.eu 
6
  Dubin, R., Theory building (Free Press 1978) ; see also Lynham, S., ‘Quantitative research and theory building: 
Dubin’s method (2002) 4 (3) Advances in Developing Human Resources 242–276 
7
 European Union, The European Union Explained, How the European Union Works, July 2012, p. 19. 
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action to Parliament and Council and for implementing the decisions of the European Parliament 
and European Council. The Commission is composed of 28 Commissioners each responsible for a 
particular policy area. These Commissioners are drawn from the member states but act on behalf 
of the Union and not on behalf of national interests. The Commission is answerable to the 
Parliament. The staff are organised into departments known as Directorates-General. In 2010 the 
former Directorate-General (DG) for Justice, Liberty and Security was divided into two Directorate-
Generals (DGs) – one for Home Affairs (Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrӧm) and one for Justice 
(Commissioner Francoise Le Bail). Counter-terrorism sits within the crisis and terrorism policy at 
Home Affairs. Other DGs can play a role in the preparation of counter-terrorism policies such as 
DG for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO). A large part of the Commission’s activity in 
the field of counter-terrorism takes place within DG Home, although given the complex nature of 
counter-terrorism activities can be spread across different DGs. For example, the data retention 
directive (which forms the basis of a SECILE case study8) implicates DG Information Society and 
Media and DG Internal Market and Services.  
The general role of the Commission in the context of counter-terrorism is to draft legislation 
implementing the EU counter-terrorism action plan.9 To this end it is involved in developing 
targeted actions and initiatives, primarily within the ‘prevent’ and ‘protect’ strands of the plan. The 
Commission has played an important role in developing the legislative framework within which 
counter terrorism policies and actions operate at EU level. A key example is the Council 
Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism which provides a common definition of terrorist and 
terrorist-linked offences.10 It has developed policies in all sectors related to the prevention of 
terrorist attacks and the management of their consequences, e.g. in countering terrorist financing11 
and in hindering access to explosives12 and to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
materials.13 The Commission is also responsible for the European Programme for the Protection of 
Critical Infrastructure14 and the EU-US Agreement on Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme.15 It is 
currently developing a European equivalent of the latter programme.16 Other important roles that 
the Commission is involved in include providing assistance to victims of terrorism, supporting 
security research projects and coordinating European Crisis Management. 
2. The European Council 
The European Council is the ‘overarching authority’ in relation to strategies involving external Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice issues.17 Article 68 of The Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union outlines the role of the European Council to ‘define the strategic guidelines for 
                                                             
8
 Hayes, B. and Jones, C., “Case Study on the Data Retention Directive”, Deliverable 2.4, SECILE. Available at 
www.secile.eu  
9
 Council of the European Union, EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism, 7233/1/07 REV 1, 29 March 2007. 
10
 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal For A Council Framework Decision On Combating Terrorism, 
Brussels, 19.9.2001, COM(2001) 521 final. 2001/0217 (CNS).   
11
 Commission of the European Communities, Communication From The Commission To The Council And The 
European Parliament on the Prevention of and the Fight against Terrorist Financing through measures to improve the 
exchange of information, to strengthen transparency and enhance the traceability of financial transactions Brussels, 
20.10.2004, COM(2004) 700 final. 
12
 Commission of the European Communities, Communication From The Commission On Measures To Ensure Greater 
Security In Explosives, Detonators, Bomb-Making Equipment And Fire-Arms, Brussels, 18.07.2005, COM(2005) 329 
final. 
13
 Commission of the European Communities, Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament And 
The Council On Strengthening Chemical, Biological, Radiological And Nuclear Security In The European Union – An EU 
CBRN Action Plan. Brussels, 24.6.2009, COM(2009) 273 final. 
14
 Commission of the European Communities, Communication From The Commission On A European Programme For 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, Brussels, 12.12.2006 COM(2006) 786 final. 
15
 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial 
Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Program. 
16
 European Commission, Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament And The Council A 
European Terrorist Finance Tracking System: Available Options. Brussels, 13.7.2011 
Com(2011) 429 Final. For further information on the role of the Commission in relation to terrorism see 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/index_en.htm  
17
 Monar, J., 2012 (1), The External Dimension of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Progress, potential 
and limitations after the Treaty of Lisbon’ Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, p.35. 
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legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice’.18 The 
European Council consists of heads of state or government from each member state joining with 
the President of the European Council (currently Herman Van Rompuy) and the President of the 
European Commission (currently José Manuel Barosso). Together they represent the highest level 
of political cooperation between member states. Based in Brussels, the role of the European 
Council is to define the political direction and priorities of the EU but it has no powers to pass laws 
per se. It does however issue Council Conclusions, which as outlined in D2.1 form a very 
substantial part of the EU’s body of counter-terrorism measures and are highly influential in the 
creation of both legislative measures within the EU and operational agreements and arrangements 
concluded by member states, often with the coordinating assistance of agencies such as Europol. 
The Council meets every six months and a number of its organisations and working groups are 
involved in counter-terrorism. 
The Council of Ministers 
The Council of Ministers, also known as simply ‘the Council’, is composed of government ministers 
from all the EU countries. Based in Brussels and Luxembourg, the role of the Council is to decide 
on proposals from the Commission and in collaboration with the Parliament to adopt decisions. 
There are ten different Council configurations within the Council of Ministers including for example 
Foreign Affairs, Agriculture and Fisheries and Competitiveness. The configurations of interest with 
relation to terrorism are the Justice and Home Affairs Council, the Foreign Affairs Council and the 
General Affairs Council.  
The work of the Council of Ministers is prepared by the Permanent Representatives Committee 
(COREPER) It is composed of member states' ambassadors and works in two configurations: 
COREPER I consists of deputy permanent representatives and deals with technical matters. 
COREPER II consists of the ambassadors and deals with political, commercial, economic and 
institutional matters. There are over 150 different working groups and parties assisting COREPER 
in its work.19  
The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is a permanent structure of the Council of the 
European Union (EU), the creation of which is provided for by Article 38 of the Treaty on EU 
(formerly Article 25 of the EU Treaty).20 The PSC contributes to the drafting and implementation of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). In particular, it defines and follows up the EU's response in the event of a crisis. The 
mission of the PSC is to monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the CFSP. In 
particular it delivers opinions to the Council in order to help define policies; coordinates, supervises 
and monitors the work led by the different Council working groups in the area of the CFSP and 
examines the draft conclusions of the General Affairs Council.21 
This section describes the Council configurations with a particular focus on terrorism, namely 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), Foreign Affairs and General Affairs, and the corresponding 
working groups that assist that Council. 
                                                             
18
 Article 68, European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 
December 2007, 2008/C 115/01, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:SOM:EN:HTML 
[accessed 24 October 2013] 
19
 For full list of council preparatory bodies please see Council of the European Union, Note from General Secretariat of 
the Council to Delegations, 5581/13, 22 January 2013. 
20
 Article 38 states: ‘Without prejudice to Article 240 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, a Political 
and Security Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security 
policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or of 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor 
the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative’. European Union, 
Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht, 7 February 1992, Official Journal of the 
European Communities C 325/5; 24 December 2002, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0013:0046:en:PDF [accessed 24 October 2013]. 
21
 See further 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/r00005_en.htm  
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Justice and Home Affairs 
In terms of implementation of counter-terrorism legislation, the JHA Council is the principal 
decision-making institution. It comprises ministers of interior and of justice. The JHA Council is 
responsible for a number of key tasks. This grouping is required to ‘to approve all programming 
documents for the JHA external dimension,(…) adopt all relevant legislative acts, take the 
decisions on the opening, signing and conclusion of international agreements in the AFSJ domain, 
approve the Commission’s negotiation mandates, decide on external risk assessments and define 
action priorities regarding specific third-countries or –regions’.22  Within the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council configuration there are five working groups of interest from a counter-terrorist 
perspective: CATS, The Terrorism working group, The Working Party on Civil Protection, The 
Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) and The Standing Committee 
on Internal Security (COSI). 
(i) CATS / Article 36 Committee 
The role of CATS (or Article 36 Committee in honour of the article of the Treaty on European Union 
(Maastricht Treaty) that established it) is to assist COREPER in relation to law enforcement and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It acts as a useful network for senior officials in the field 
and focuses in particular on 'horizontal or cross cutting issues in the field of law enforcement and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters and on politically important legislative proposals and non-
legislative initiatives'.23 Its role is to: 
 be involved in in-depth discussions on relevant multiannual programs and their respective 
evaluation;  
 facilitate work in the field of law enforcement and judicial cooperation matters by clearing 
the number of outstanding questions and thus narrowing down the issues to be examined 
by COREPER and Council;   
 serve as a forum for an initial exchange of views in case of politically important legislative 
proposals and initiatives in order to set the direction for work at expert level in the relevant 
working parties;   
 serve as a complementary forum for the purpose of informing and/or consulting Member 
States by the Commission in relation to important forthcoming initiatives;  
 be a forum for the exchange of information on developments of interest in the areas of its 
mandate, in particular pending cases and developments in the case law of the Court of 
Justice / European Court of Human Rights24 
 
(ii) Terrorism Working Group (TWG) 
The Terrorism working group comprises interior ministry representatives and law enforcement 
agencies of member states focusing on internal terrorism threats. This group meets three times per 
Presidency and deals with internal threat assessments, practical cooperation and coordination 
among EU bodies.25 
(iii) Working Party on Civil Protection (PROCIV) 
The Working Party on Civil Protection works on early warning mechanism and consequence 
management as a whole.26  
                                                             
22
 Monar, J., 2012 (1), The External Dimension of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Progress, potential 
and limitations after the Treaty of Lisbon’ Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, p.37. 
23
 Council of the European Union, 'I' item note from the General Secretariat of the Council to COREPER, The Future of 
CATS, 17187/11, 18 November 2011. 
24
 Council of the European Union, 'I' item note from the General Secretariat of the Council to COREPER, The Future of 
CATS, 17187/11, 18 November 2011. 
25
 The Council of the European Union (05.2004), Working Structures of the Council in terrorism matters - Options paper, 
Note from EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to COREPER. Doc. 9791/04,25.05.2004, p.2. 
26
 The Council of the European Union (05.2004), Working Structures of the Council in terrorism matters - Options paper, 
Note from EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to COREPER. Doc. 9791/04,25.05.2004, p.2. 
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(iv) Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) 
The Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) coordinates the work of 
the various working groups in the field of migration, visa, borders and asylum.27 
(v) COSI 
The Standing Committee on Internal Security was created by the Lisbon Treaty in order to 'ensure 
that operational cooperation on internal security is promoted and strengthened' within the EU.28 It 
is composed of representatives from national security services who coordinate operational 
cooperation in criminal matters in internal security. If the situation requires it, expertise can be 
sought from the Working group on external JHA issues (JAIEX). 
General Affairs Council 
The second Council configuration of interest in relation to counter-terrorism is the General Affairs 
Council.  It deals with dossiers that affect more than one of the Union's policies, such as 
negotiations on EU enlargement, preparation of the Union's multi-annual budgetary perspective or 
institutional and administrative issues. It co-ordinates preparation for and follow-up to meetings of 
the European Council. It also exercises a role in co-ordinating work on different policy areas 
carried out by the Council's other configurations. The Security Committee is the key working group 
assisting the General Affairs Council in its work for the Council of Ministers. 
The Security Committee examines and assesses any security matter and makes recommendations 
to the Council when appropriate. The Security Committee has established 3 expert sub-groups 
within the areas of Information Assurance, GNSS (Global Satellite Navigation System) and 
Security Accreditation. 
Foreign Affairs 
Within the Foreign Affairs configuration of the Council there are three working groups that 
contribute to the preparation of counter-terrorism legislation: the Working Party on Terrorism 
(International aspects)(COTER); the Working Party on the application of specific measures to 
combat terrorism, and the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors. 
(i) Working Party on Terrorism (International Aspects) (COTER) 
The Working party on terrorism (International aspects), also known as COTER, is composed of 
foreign ministry representatives working on external aspects of counter-terrorism. This group 
meets once a month and deals with issues relating to external matters, threat assessments and 
policy recommendations as regards third countries and regions, implementation of UN 
Conventions and coordination of work, in particular in the UN, seminars on financing of terrorism.29 
(ii) The Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party (RELEX) 
The Relex group deals with legal, financial and institutional issues in the external field with the 
main focus on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Priorities include the financing of 
external activities, EU crisis management operations, non-proliferation, sanctions, EU Special 
Representatives and other crosscutting issues. 
                                                             
27
 The Council of the European Union (05.2004), Working Structures of the Council in terrorism matters - Options paper, 
Note from EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to COREPER. Doc. 9791/04,25.05.2004, p.2. 
28
 Article 71 states: ‘A standing committee shall be set up within the Council in order to ensure that operational 
cooperation on internal security is promoted and strengthened within the Union. Without prejudice to Article 240, it shall 
facilitate coordination of the action of Member States’ competent authorities. Representatives of the Union bodies, offices 
and agencies concerned may be involved in the proceedings of this committee. The European Parliament and national 
Parliaments shall be kept informed of the proceedings.’ European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, 13 December 2007, 2008/C 115/01, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:PDF [accessed 24 October 2013]. 
29
 The Council of the European Union (05.2004), Working Structures of the Council in terrorism matters - Options paper, 
Note from EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to COREPER. Doc. 9791/04,25.05.2004, p.2. 
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(iii) The Working Party on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (CP 931 WP) 
The role of the working party on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism is to 
implement Common Position 2001/931/CFSP.30 In particular its mandate is to: 
 examine and evaluate information with a view to listing and de-listing of persons, groups 
and entities pursuant to Common Position 2001/931/CFSP;  
 assess whether the information meets the criteria set out in Common Position 
2001/931/CFSP and in the Council's statement agreed when the Common Position was 
adopted; 
 prepare the regular review of the list as foreseen in Article 1(6) of the Common Position; 
 and make recommendations for listings and de-listings to be reflected in the necessary 
legal instruments, which will be endorsed by the Permanent Representatives Committee 
with a view to their adoption by the Council.31 
 
The Council Secretariat 
(i) EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator 
The position of EU counter-terrorism coordinator was established in 2004 in the aftermath of the 
Madrid bombings.32 Gijs de Vries was the first incumbent and was succeeded by Gilles de 
Kerchove in 2007.  The EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator is situated in the Council's General 
Secretariat and works under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission (Catherine Ashton) but 
takes instruction from and reports to the JHA Council. The role of the CTC is to coordinate counter-
terrorism activities within the Council, monitor the implementation of measures, communicate and 
ensure cooperation. The importance of this position was reaffirmed in the Stockholm Programme.33 
3. European Parliament 
The European Parliament is the directly elected legislative arm of the EU. Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) are elected every five years to represent their interests. The 
Parliament currently has 766 members across 28 countries. The Parliament has three main roles. 
It shares with the Council the power to legislate; secondly, it exercises democratic supervision over 
all EU institutions; and finally it manages the EU budget alongside the Council.34 Much of the work 
of the Parliament is organised by committee. The Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
Committee (LIBE) is in charge of most of the legislation and democratic oversight for policies linked 
to the transformation of the European Union in the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ). 
Current work themes of the Committee include voting on the EU Data Protection Package and a 
hearing on the situation of fundamental rights in the EU, both reflecting the Parliament's traditional 
role of human rights and civil liberties monitor.35 The second relevant committee is the Committee 
                                                             
30
 Council of the European Union, Fight Against the Financing of Terrorism: Implementation of Common Position 
2001/931/CFSP, Doc. 10826/1/07, Rev. 1, 28
th
 June 2007 available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st10/st10826-re01.en07.pdf  
31
 Council of the European Union, Fight Against the Financing of Terrorism: Implementation of Common Position 
2001/931/CFSP, Doc. 10826/1/07, Rev. 1, 28
th
 June 2007, pg. 4 available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st10/st10826-re01.en07.pdf. Although not their core business, a number of 
other grounds under Foreign Affairs may engage to some degree with counter-terrorism, such as the European Union 
Military Committee (which directs all EU military activity and advises the Political and Security Committee), the Politico-
Military Group (which handles politico-military aspects of the Common Security and Defence Policy), and the European 
Union Military Committee Working Group (which prepares materials relating to many of the issues dealt with by the 
EUMC). 
32
 The Council of the European Union (03.2004). Declaration on combating terrorism adopted by the European Council 
at its meeting on 25 March 2004. Doc. 7906/04, p.14. 
33
 The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens [Official Journal C 115 of 
4.5.2010]., pg. 85: ‘The European Council reaffirms the importance of the role of the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator 
in ensuring implementation and evaluation of the Counter Terrorist strategy, coordinating Counter Terrorist work within 
the Union, and fostering better communication between the Union and third countries’. 
34
 European Union, The European Union Explained, How the European Union Works, July 2012, p.10. 
35
 For more information about the LIBE committee see: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/home.html  
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on Foreign Affairs which helps to formulate and monitor a foreign policy that addresses the 
interests of the Union, the security expectations of its citizens and the stability of its neighbours 
while ensuring an overall coherence and effectiveness.36 This committee is currently absorbed in 
the issue of transatlantic spying and citizens privacy implications. 
Post Lisbon, the European Parliament now has full co-decision powers. The Parliament flexed its 
new found muscle in February 2010 when it rejected the SWIFT Interim Agreement between the 
EU and US intended to facilitate the transfer of financial data. The agreement was rejected by the 
LIBE committee on the grounds of inadequate data protection provision, lack of requirement of 
judicial authorisation, lack of rules on retention and oversight.37 The Agreement was subsequently 
renegotiated and passed by Parliament in July 2010 leaving some to suggest that its earlier 
recalcitrance was more about ‘affirming institutional prerogatives than substantive policy 
reasons’.38 Regardless, the SWIFT case established a precedent for future negotiations involving 
the Parliament. 
4. EU agencies 
The European Defence Agency 
The role of the EDA is to support the Council and member states in improving EU defence 
capabilities as part of the CSDP. It was established under a joint action of the Council of Ministers 
in 2004.39 The head of the EDA, Catherine Ashton, is also the head of the EEAS.  
Europol 
Europol is the European Union’s law enforcement agency assisting member states in their fight 
against terrorism.40 Established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, it became operational in 1998, is 
based at The Hague, the Netherlands and has a staff of almost 800. They do not have direct 
powers of arrest but rather work closely with law enforcement agencies across the 28 member 
states and with non-EU partner states like Australia, Canada, USA and Norway. Europol officers 
gather, analyse and disseminate information and coordinate intelligence. Experts take part in Joint 
Investigation Teams. Europol can only work when national security and intelligence services share 
information with it. It has no power to oblige them to cooperate. A multi-agency approach draws 
personnel from different types of national law enforcement agencies.  Each year they conduct over 
13,500 cross-border investigations. 
Europol is accountable to the European Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs who 
appoints the Director and Deputy Directors. The Council, together with the Parliament, approves 
the budget for Europol. Within Europol, the two key counter-terrorism instruments are the Counter-
Terrorism Unit and the Counter-Terrorism Task Force.41 Europol publishes annually a detailed 
account of the state of terrorism in the EU called the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-
SAT).42 
                                                             
36
 For more information about the Committee on Foreign Affairs see: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/afet/home.html  
37
 European Parliament: Draft Recommendation on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of the 
Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial 
Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Rapporteur: Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, PE438.440v01-
00,3.2.2010. 
38
 See for example the discussion on the SWIFT case in Monar, J., 2012 (1), The External Dimension of the EU’s Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice: Progress, potential and limitations after the Treaty of Lisbon’ Swedish Institute for 
European Policy Studies, p.42. 
39
 Council Joint Action 2004/551/Cfsp Of 12 July 2004 On The Establishment Of The European Defence Agency.  
And later Council Decision 2011/411/CFSP of 12 July 2011 defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the 
European Defence Agency and repealing Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP. 
40
 Legal basis is Article 23 of the Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol) 
(2009/371/JHA), OJ L 121/37-66 of 15.5.2009. 
41
 Casale, D., 2008, EU Institutional and Legal Counter-terrorism Framework, Defence Against Terrorism Review, Vol. 1, 
No. 1, p.55. 
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 See for example Europol, TE-SAT 2013 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. 
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The Lisbon Treaty conferred a legal personality to Europol allowing it to enter into international 
agreements. Europol’s work in the field of counter terrorism is conducted through the negotiation of 
such agreements with third countries or third-country authorities.43 There are two types of 
agreements. Operational agreements are far reaching permitting the exchange of personal data 
between cooperation partners. These agreements have been signed with nine non-EU states: the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Monaco, Australia, Croatia, Canada, Iceland, Norway, 
the Swiss Confederation, USA, one European organisation, Eurojust and one international 
organisation, Interpol. 
Less far reaching strategic agreements permit the exchange of strategic and technical information 
and provide for training but they do not permit the exchange of personal data. These agreements 
have been signed with nine non-EU states: Ukraine, Republic of Serbia, Montenegro, Moldova, 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Russia and Turkey. They have been signed with four 
European agencies: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control, The European Agency for the management of operational 
cooperation at the external borders of the member states of the European Union, European Anti-
Fraud Office, Cepol; two European institutions: European Central Bank, the European Commission 
and two international organisations UN Office on Drugs and Crime, World Customs Organisation. 
Eurojust 
Eurojust was established in 2002 replacing its forerunner Pro-Eurojust.44 Acting as a cross-border 
judicial coordination unit, its mission is ‘to support and strengthen coordination and cooperation 
between national investigating and prosecuting authorities in relation to serious crime affecting two 
or more Member States […]’.45 Based at The Hague, it works with member states assisting them in 
dealing with cross-border threats such as that posed by terrorism. It is staffed by lawyers, judges 
and other legal experts seconded from each member state. Each member state designates a 
National Correspondent for terrorism.46 Eurojust's competencies have expanded and strengthened 
with various Council amendments in 2003 and 2008.47 The Lisbon Treaty envisages further 
development of Eurojust with Article 86 stating “in order to combat crimes affecting the financial 
interests of the Union, the Council, by means of regulations adopted in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure, may establish a European Public Prosecutor’s Office from Eurojust".48 
The Lisbon Treaty conferred a legal personality to Eurojust permitting it to enter into international 
agreements. Eurojust has been active in negotiating cooperation agreements with third States and 
other EU agencies, allowing the exchange of judicial information and personal data.49 Agreements 
were concluded with a number of EU partners including Europol, the European Commission, 
CEPOL, OLAF and the European Judicial Training Network. Third States agreements have been 
entered into with Lichtenstein, the Swiss Confederation, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Croatia, the USA, Iceland and Norway. Agreements have been reached with a number 
of international organisations including Interpol, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and 
Iberoamerican Network of International Legal Cooperation. Liaison prosecutors from Norway and 
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 Current list (Oct. 2013) taken from Europol website: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/europol-eu-121  
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 Eurojust was established by Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 . This was subsequently amended in 
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2008). 
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2008). 
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the USA are now permanently based at Eurojust. In addition to cooperation agreements, Eurojust 
also maintains a network of contact points worldwide. 
Frontex 
The European Agency for the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of 
the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) was established in 2004.50 Based in Warsaw, 
Poland, Frontex aims to balance the freedoms associated with the eradication of internal borders 
within the Schengen area with the potential security issues that such an arrangement can invite. 
Described as ‘compensatory measures’, Frontex focuses on cooperation and coordination of police 
and judicial authorities work.  
Similar to Europol and Eurojust, Frontex has a legal personality and can enter into international 
agreements. Frontex has the authority to enter into working arrangements with third countries and 
as of June 2012 has concluded 17 such arrangements with: the Russian Federation, Ukraine, 
Croatia, Moldova, Georgia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the United States, Montenegro, Belarus, Canada, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Armenia 
and Turkey as well as with the CIS Border Troop Commanders Council and the MARRI Regional 
Centre in the Western Balkans. It is in various stages of negotiations with the authorities of a 
further eight countries: Libya, Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Egypt, Brazil, Tunisia and 
Azerbaijan.51 
European External Action Service 
The European External Action Service (EEAS) was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and started to 
function in 2011.52 The HR/VP heads this service and the staff are drawn from the Commission, 
the Council and from member states foreign ministries. The EEAS is the EU's diplomatic arm 
assisting the HR/VP in the coordination of EU external action. There are two agencies and services 
within EEAS that are relevant to counterterrorism: EU SITCEN and EUMS Intelligence Directorate 
(EUMS INT). They were previously located within the Council's General Secretariat but were 
transferred to EEAS by the Lisbon Treaty. 
(i) EU SITCEN 
The EU Situation centre (SITCEN) is a strategic analytical body of 80 analysts who prepare 
intelligence reports on the basis of intelligence collected by member states, EU delegations, CSDP 
missions and open sources. It produces assessments of the internal and external security threat.53. 
(ii) EUMS INT  
Similar to EU SITCEN, EUMS INT has a staff of 40 analysts producing intelligence reports for the 
EEAS.54 
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 FRONTEX was established by Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004/ (26.10.2004, OJ L 349/25.11.2004) having regard 
to the Treaty establishing the European Community. It was later amended by the Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the 
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 Renard, T., 2012, EU Counterterrorism Policies and Institutions After the Lisbon Treaty, Center on Global 
Counterterrorism Cooperation Policy Brief, September 2012, p.9. 
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 Renard, T., 2012, EU Counterterrorism Policies and Institutions After the Lisbon Treaty, Center on Global 
Counterterrorism Cooperation Policy Brief, September 2012, p.10. 
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5. Outside of the EU 
The Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG) 
The Counter-Terrorism group facilitates cooperation between European internal intelligence 
services outside EU structures.55 The intelligence services of the Member States have long co-
operated in the fight against terrorism within the informal framework of the so-called 'Club of Bern', 
where some other European countries participate as well. This co-operation is based on mutual 
trust and flexibility. After 11 September 2001, Member States' intelligence services, following the 
conclusions of the European Council of 21 September 2001, have stepped up their counter- co-
ordination within the "Counter-terrorism group" (CTG) of the Club of Bern, which brings together 
the counterterrorist experts of the intelligence services on a regular basis to facilitate cooperation. 
The group focuses specifically on Islamic extremist terrorism. Police services do not participate in 
this group but rather cooperate in the Police Chiefs' Task Force and the Police Working Group on 
Terrorism.56 
European Police Chiefs’ Task Force 
This is a forum for the heads of states' police forces where they meet to agree targets for action in 
the area of terrorism.57 It was established at an EU Council Decision meeting in Tampere in 1999 
and began to meet from 2000. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the Task Force meets under the European 
Police Chiefs Convention. It is not accountable to the Union as it has no Treaty basis but rather 
was formed on the basis of a Council Recommendation.58 
The Police Working Group on Terrorism 
The Police Working Group on Terrorism was established in 1979 by the UK, Netherlands, 
Germany and Belgium following the assassination of the British Ambassador to Ireland in 1976. 59 
Other countries followed suit by joining the group and formal cooperation was achieved in 1986 
with the ‘Political Declaration by the Governments of the Member States on the Free Movement of 
Persons’.60 
Contact Group (Network of Focal Points) 
In addition to the above mentioned working groups of the Council, there is a Contact Group 
(network of focal points) of persons from the Member States' Brussels Permanent Representations 
dealing with all aspects of terrorism. It is, as the title suggests, a contact group of focal points for 
preparing the meetings of the Council preparatory bodies. It is not a Council working group. Its 
purpose is to act as a central contact point on issues related to counter-terrorism guaranteeing the 
flow of information to the relevant competent authorities in the member states.61 
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CASE STUDY: IMPLEMENTING COM(2009)538 IN IRELAND 
Ireland chose Maritime Security and Surveillance as one of its key 2012-2013 EU Presidency 
priorities.62 From a maritime perspective, this was a marked step forward as Ireland had previously 
suffered from ‘sea blindness’, i.e. a lack of appreciation and awareness at public and political levels 
of maritime issues. Identifying maritime security and surveillance as a priority area thus 
represented an increased awareness of the potential offered to the State by its maritime domain. 
Maritime surveillance has been recognised by the EU as an area where existing systems can be 
used for many security as well as safety purposes, including counter terrorism.63 In its 
Communication on the Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union, the  European 
Commission undertook to "take steps towards a more interoperable surveillance system to bring 
together existing monitoring and tracking systems used for maritime safety and security, protection 
of the marine environment, fisheries control, control of external borders and other law enforcement 
activities."64 
The General Affairs Council of 8 December 2008 encouraged the Commission to work towards 
interoperability between national and Community systems so as to increase the cost effectiveness 
of maritime surveillance operations. This approach towards further integration of maritime 
surveillance was confirmed in the roadmap for the development of the European Border 
Surveillance System (EUROSUR), which foresaw the gradual creation of a Common Information 
Sharing Environment (CISE) for the EU maritime domain,65 as well as in the recent updating of the 
Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system.66 
The concentration on maritime surveillance reflects the fact that, on a daily basis, tens of 
thousands of activities take place in EU waters. To ensure that these activities take place in a safe 
manner and to assess and manage their impact on security, the economy, and the marine 
environment, it is considered that there is a critical need for these activities to be subjected to 
surveillance. In order to be effective, this surveillance must take place on both a national and a 
transnational basis, so that there is cooperation between states in terms of operations and 
information sharing. In advance of the Council Communication there was a recognised lack of 
maritime strategy and of recognised maritime picture67 across the EU, and a need for the pooling 
and sharing of assets, information and other resources between national agencies. Although 
significant advances had been made in the collection and exchange of some maritime surveillance 
information (such as the position of ships) by control authorities and within specific maritime 
surveillance user communities, the sharing of surveillance data between user communities had not 
taken place to the same extent. One concern was that for many States within the EU the 
recognised maritime picture did not include complementary information gathered by other sectoral 
users due to the lack of mutual exchange. This led to situations where data which would have been 
useful to other user communities were not shared or where the same data were collected by 
several authorities. The need to develop an enhanced system of maritime surveillance was thus 
well accepted, and the existing regulatory structure was contingent on a level of pooling and 
sharing that had proved challenging to achieve. Thus the Council Communication focused on 
ameliorating the ‘sea blindness’ within the European security surveillance system.  
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The Council Communication 
COM(2009)538 (Towards the integration of maritime surveillance: A common information sharing 
environment for the EU maritime domain) reiterates that the aim of integrated maritime surveillance 
is the enhancement of situational awareness of sea activities that impact on maritime safety and 
security, border control, the marine environment, fisheries, trade and the EU’s economic interests. 
Bearing this in mind the Communication aims to outline guiding principles that could be applied to 
the development of a common information sharing environment, building towards the 
establishment of such an environment. Across these principles—discussed below—was a 
commitment to ensuring interoperability between the new environment and existing systems, the 
improvement of situational awareness, efficiency, and subsidiarity.68  
Reflecting this, the communication outlines the following Principles: 
1. The approach should interlink all user communities 
2. A technical framework for interoperability and future integration should be built in 
3. There should be information exchange between civilian and military authorities 
4. Specific legal provisions that are both obstacles and aides to achievement should be 
identified and addressed 
 
These principles were to be applied in the development of a common information sharing 
environment. The Communication defines the relevant elements as follows:69 
 'Common': As the information is to be shared between the different user 
communities, data used for this information should be collected only once.  
 'Information' must enable user-defined situational awareness. Coming from 
disparate user communities, information should be identifiable, accessible, 
understandable and usable. Processing such information with the appropriate 
security safeguards must be ensured.  
 'Sharing' means that each community receives but also provides information on the 
basis of previously agreed standards and procedures.  
 'Environment' refers to interconnected sectoral information systems that allows for 
users to build up their specific situational awareness pictures, which enable them to 
identify trends and detect anomalies and threats.  
The construction of a common information sharing environment is recognised as a challenging 
enterprise, with the Council Communication noting: 
“Building a 'Common Information Sharing Environment' for the EU 'maritime domain' may 
be best achieved through a non-hierarchical technical framework of maritime monitoring 
and surveillance systems. Such architecture should be designed as a cost effective 
interaction of different information layers to enable the improvement of user defined 
pictures. The system architecture must allow data to be inter alia collected, merged, 
analysed, disseminated and managed at the appropriate level of decentralisation, 
depending on security concerns (e.g. intelligence) and in compliance with data protection 
regulations, international rules and functional requirements. Best use should be made of 
existing systems”70 
It is foreseen that upon completion the system will operate as follows:71 
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When implemented, the common information sharing environment will result in improved maritime 
situational awareness across the EU. ‘Maritime situational awareness’ is the effective 
understanding of activity on the sea that could impact the security, safety, economy, or 
environment of the European Union and its Member States. On the basis of clearly defined user 
needs and rights, it assists the authorities responsible for monitoring and surveillance activities in 
preventing and managing in a comprehensive way all such situations, events and actions related to 
the EU maritime domain. The EU maritime domain encompasses the EU Member States’ 
Territorial Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Platforms as defined by the 1982 
United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, as well as all maritime-related activities carried out 
therein, on the seabed, subsurface, surface and above the sea such as installations, cargo, small 
boats and vessels flagged, owned, managed by or bound to the EU. Beyond the above, it also 
comprises any Search and Rescue Area and any Area of Operations that has been designated for 
an EU Maritime Operation under civil or military authority. 
Along with 17 other states, Ireland has decided to implement the Council Communication by 
participating in the development of systems entitled Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) and 
Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP). MARSUR was originally developed by the European Defence 
Agency (EDA) as a response to the commitment to the Common Information Sharing Environment 
outlined in the Council Communication. Ireland is one of a number of countries implementing the 
Communication through these systems. Following a tasking by the EU Defence Ministers in late 
2005, the EDA launched the Maritime Surveillance project (MARSUR) in September 2006, to 
create a network using existing naval and maritime information exchange systems. Overall goals 
are to avoid duplication of effort and the use of available technologies, data and information; to 
enhance cooperation in a simple, efficient and low-cost solution for civil-military cooperation; and to 
support safety and security.72 The MARSUR network is built by the navies and is meant to 
enhance the exchange of data and information for the conduct of maritime CSDP-operations. 
MARSUR has been handed over by the EDA to the participating countries, including Ireland, who 
signed up to implement and progress the project. This project is due for completion by 2014. At 
present there are 17 EU member states involved in the original MARSUR Project: Belgium, 
Cyprus, Germany, Spain, Finland, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Sweden, the UK, Bulgaria and Latvia. Norway is also a signatory to the 
Technical Arrangements. Thus a total of 18 countries currently participate in MARSUR. Engaging 
in MARSUR as a matter of policy has required the creation and implementation of new operational 
posts, systems and policies at national and transnational level to which we now turn. 
From Policy to Operations: The Irish perspective 
The Irish Naval Service has moved forward on the recommendations and requirements of the 
Council Communication and has set up a section dedicated to implementing the Maritime 
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Surveillance policy at an operational level. A Naval Officer of the rank of Lieutenant Commander 
was appointed as the ‘subject matter expert’ for maritime surveillance and is a member of all 
relevant committees of the syndicate of 18 states.73 This Officer has been given the authority to act 
on behalf of the Naval Service to implement policy, training, software and hardware systems in 
order for Ireland to contribute as required to the maritime picture and engage with the transfer, 
request and sharing of relevant information. It is anticipated that MARSUR and RMP will reach full 
implementation in 2014,74 but information sharing through Situation Reports (SitReps) is already 
taking place in advance of this. 
MARSUR 
The implementation of MARSUR by the syndicate of 18 states started on 15 December 2011 when 
the signature of the Technical Arrangement for the MARSUR Live Phase was completed by the 
authorised representative. In Ireland’s case the authorised representative was the Assistant 
Secretary at the Department for Defence. The aim of MARSUR is to share maritime surveillance 
information and further develop the existing concepts, technical solutions and procedures as 
established by the demonstration phase run by the EDA. This is achieved by ensuring that the 18 
members of the syndicate all gather the same information and by creating secure systems for data 
exchange between these states. Data is exchanged through both national SitReps and by requests 
for data verification between states so that, once it becomes fully implemented (2014), MARSUR 
will be a monitored, live system in each state running 24-hours a day. 
The operational objectives of MARSUR are to 
 Create and maintain 24/7 MARSUR networking 
 Exchange maritime situational information 
 Exchange maritime intelligence knowledge 
 Archive relevant maritime information 
 
MARSUR can be used as a tool to help to identify threats and help operators determine risks 
associated with them.75 In operational terms for the Naval Service, this means that if one of our 
warships encounters a vessel of interest (VOI) then information can be quickly and securely 
passed from the ship, to the operations cell and on to other states’ navies as required. This can be 
by several means, including voice, chat or email through the MARSUR exchange system (MEXS), 
illustrated below. A MARSUR exchange system or MEXS is a piece of hardware specifically 
developed and designed for the project in Ireland. The idea would be that each of the 18 countries 
involved has a similar exchange mechanism and each can exchange data using this ‘point to point’ 
system. The system can be used for queries as well as passing data over the secure network. 
There are a number of feeds into the system, which in Ireland include the Vessel Monitoring 
System (VMS) (predating the Council Communication), the Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
(predating the Council Communication), and the Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP). MARSUR 
will allow for maritime surveillance information to be exchanged in relation to security operations 
relating to, for example, illegal immigration, criminal or hostile acts, organized crime, pollution, 
proliferation of armament, narcotic trafficking, piracy and robbery at sea, distressed vessels, and 
terrorism. 
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Diagram of MARSUR system operation from the MARSUR Factsheet (EDA) 
Operationally MARSUR has been and is being developed according to protocols and technical 
agreements between the syndicate states. The relevant documents are the MARSUR Technical 
Arrangement between the various participants signed in Brussels 10 November 2011 (which 
outlines the general working of MARSUR following the demonstration phase), the Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) draft dated 22 March 2012 (outlining how MARSUR will operate in practical 
terms and including the Standard Operating Procedures issued as Annex E to CONOPS). 
CONOPS was drafted through working groups of representatives from the 18 states participating in 
MARSUR, thus building in operational perspectives in order to maximise cooperation from the 
outset. The Concept of Operations Draft is an overarching operational document for the 
information exchange between the participants within the Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR). This 
concept provides terms and definitions in order to ensure common understanding as well as 
general guideline on how to plan, execute and access the exchange of sea surveillance 
information shared in MARSUR. In general administrative information and information regarding 
the exchange principles within MARSUR are regarded as unclassified in order to support and 
ensure future interoperability with other sea surveillance co-operations and/or involved agencies.76 
The CONOPS document is a draft ‘living’ document and is marked as unclassified. At a national 
level, Naval Service Standard Operating Procedures have been drafted in order to outline how the 
system will be developed, implemented and operated in Ireland in a manner compliant with Annex 
E to CONOPS. An equivalent process to outline national implementation is being undertaken in 
each of the 18 syndicate states.  
Each state participating in the system has its own MARSUR Area Of Responsibility (AOR), where it 
has the role of reporting contact (i.e. vessels and aircraft under, on and over the sea). This area is 
still being fully defined as it can in some instances, span globally in terms of jurisdiction in line with 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  
This illustrates the trajectory to date of the CISE proposal from Council Communication, to EDA 
development of a protocol and demonstration phase, to member state buy-in to the live phase, 
technical agreement, cross-state operating procedures, and then national operational procedures. 
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After MARSUR 
At the same time as the MARSUR live stage is being brought to completion, a ‘Category B’ project, 
complimentary to the main MARSUR project, is also being developed. As of October 2012,77 12 of 
the member States had signed up to the €1 million Project Arrangement know as Category B. This 
Category B Project (Cat B) aims to further develop the technical elements necessary to use 
MARSUR in a fully operational context. It will accommodate confidentiality issues and new 
requirements proposed by the member states. The project outlines the equipment and networks 
necessary to implement a secure, encrypted network for the exchange of classified information in 
the support of CSDP operations. This will allow for maximization of co operation while maintaining 
appropriate levels of security. 
RMP – Recognised Maritime Picture 
As mentioned above, one of the systems feeding information into MARSUR is the Recognised 
Maritime Picture (RMP). RMP is a constantly evolving technology. A recognised maritime picture 
gives a layered overview of marine traffic operating in an area at any one time. Vessels can be 
filtered using available feeds and information to ascertain if security threats exist. In Ireland a Next 
Generation Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP) project is now underway, funded through the 
European Space Agency’s Integrated Applications Promotion (IAP) Programme. The project is led 
by Skytek, a private company based in Dublin, and partners include the Irish Naval Service, the 
Coastal Marine Resource Centre (CMRC), the National Space Centre Ltd. It thus involves a 
partnership of military, civilian and private actors in developing technologies to feed into MARSUR 
as well as for general maritime purposes. The project aims to greatly enhance the quality and 
accuracy of the recognised maritime picture for the Irish Naval Service through the integration of 
several additional data sources not currently used to generate an RMP, including satellite AIS 
(Automatic Identification System). Within this project through the application of state of the art data 
mining, data analysis and simulations it will be possible to provide for early identification of unusual 
behaviour of vessels and alerting RMP operators for planning of future investigation of these 
vessels by the Irish Naval Service. The project tasks are allocated across the partnership between 
Skytek (as overall system developer), CMRC (Data Mining and RMP expertise), National Space 
Centre Ireland (for satellite receiver infrastructure) and the Irish Naval Services (end user 
requirements and demonstrator testing).78 
Challenges in Implementing Maritime Security and Surveillance Measures 
In improving maritime security and surveillance in order to fulfil the Council Communication, a 
number of challenges arise that must be grappled with by operational actors. The first is sea 
blindness. Most maritime stakeholders, be they member states or EU bodies, suffer the effects of 
sea blindness in the general population. To be convinced of the need for robust maritime security, 
and therefore of improved maritime surveillance, it is necessary first to be persuaded of the 
importance of the sea for the welfare and prosperity of the EU - as a means of commerce, as a 
source of energy and food and, conversely, as a conduit for many kinds of damaging, illegal, 
dangerous and criminal activities. Without this recognition policy change, resourcing and 
implementation are all difficult.79  
Second, changes in mindset continue to lag behind technology so that shifting the operational 
mindset on information exchange from secrecy to transparency is proving to be very slow. This 
was reported on by the Wise Pens Team in 201080 and continues to be an issue for Maritime 
Surveillance at an operational level today.  The Wise Pens report warned that if the exchange of 
non-sensitive data or information is either insufficiently substantial or insufficiently prompt EU 
countries will continue to be at risk of a possible shock event which would expose and highlight the 
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current European inability to “join the dots” and provide warning intelligence by synthesising the 
available information held by different actors.81   
A further challenge in the context of maritime surveillance and security is the lack of a specific 
European Security Strategy for maritime security. The European Security Strategy of 2003 does 
not explicitly address the maritime domain, where the complex span of threats, risks, vulnerabilities 
and challenges requires a fundamentally different approach to strategic monitoring and 
governance from that which applies ashore. The Lisbon Treaty’s Clause 222 has also brought new 
solidarity obligations. The Wise Pens Team made a proposal for a new EU Maritime Security 
Strategy in their report, but until the emergence of maritime terrorism and the resurgence of high 
profile piracy, many states and the shipping community were relatively content with the sea 
remaining an essentially ungoverned space. Although technology is now enabling surveillance and 
monitoring of that space, effective governance depends on cooperative information sharing and 
coordinated enforcement (preferably far from EU shores) by different assets and capabilities, which 
has yet to develop in the EU and more widely. Enabling that development requires a maritime 
strategy. 
A further general challenge was the translation from policy (contained in the Communication) to 
practice (MARSUR). The Communication lays out general principles (outlined above) and the 
general desirability of a common information sharing exchange, however the translation of this into 
action required significant agency innovation by the EDA and then by the syndicate of states 
engaging in MARSUR. The Category B Project also illustrates that small countries can innovate to 
find ways to share the burden of satisfying European security policy imperatives. 
Beyond these general challenges two specific challenges have arisen in the context of MARSUR. 
The first relates to the process by which new members are permitted to join the MARSUR project, 
which is by a ballot of the members. If any ‘no’ votes are put forward, the application automatically 
fails. This may act as a disincentive towards applying to join MARSUR or otherwise act as a barrier 
to prevent full operational harmonisation across the EU.  
 
Finally monitoring within MARSUR raises some challenges. In general command and control 
functions within MARSUR are subject to the participants’ national chain of command. The co-
operation between the participants will be based upon the principle of consensus and no MARSUR 
command and control is established during the daily routine.82 MARSUR does have a discrete 
structure that exists as a separate layer to domestic structures. The MARSUR organisation 
consists of two different levels: the MARSUR Management Group, and ‘beneath’ this two working 
groups, the MARSUR Operational Working Group and the MARSUR Technical Working Group.  
CONCLUSIONS: IMPACT, LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS FROM AN 
OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Operationalising European counter-terrorism is challenging from a number of perspectives. First of 
all the European counter-terrorist infrastructure is, itself, sprawling and the sites of counter-terrorist 
activity are many. Thus, counter-terrorist policy can emanate from a large number of locations 
within the European Union and the precision with which this policy is expressed for 
operationalisation may vary accordingly. As outlined in D2.1 it was the case prior to the Lisbon 
Treaty that the Council Communication was a very prevalent mechanism of creating EU counter-
terrorism, however these Communications are essentially political commitments emanating from a 
political institution so that they leave to the agencies of the EU and the member states a significant 
challenge in operational terms. These agencies must determine how the often general and vague 
commitments or aspirations enshrined in these documents are to be operationalised in practice. 
The operationalisation of what are essentially political commitments is also challenging, particularly 
as language barriers and resource inequalities across states become germane. Operationalisation 
                                                             
81
 Wise Pens Team Final Report Oct 2010, pg.16 
82
 Ibid para 157 
D3.3 Operational Report 
SECILE project – GA: 313195 
 
21 
can have significant resource implications, and in some cases the EU counter-terrorism policy in 
question is of most immediate concern to only some of the states so that they carry a large 
proportion of the costs of operationalisation; a situation that is exacerbated where the policy is 
enshrined in a Council Communication rather than a legally binding instrument. This is reflected in 
the case study presented in this report, for example, where it was primarily states with significant 
territorial waters that participated in the development of MARSUR and smaller states within that 
sub-set that are subsequently involved in the development of the Category B Project. 
These general observations together with the case study suggest that when considering the 
impact, legitimacy and effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism measures practical, measurable and 
observable matters ought to be taken heavily into account.  
In terms of impact the case study illustrates that the operationalisation of EU counter-terrorism 
measures can have significant impacts within the nation state. In this respect, impact might be 
understood as the effect that operationalisation has on the operational framework (for example, 
does it create new institutions or practices within the broader framework of operation of the 
national authority itself), on roles (for example, does it necessitate the creation of new roles or 
offices at national level), and on resources (such as training needs and other compliance costs). At 
a national level the impact of operationalisation for the operationalising institution may, then, be 
empirically measurable inasmuch as a cost (in terms of time, personnel and resources) may be 
calculable. Operationalisation can also create impact at the Euroepan level, which might again be 
understood in terms of operational frameworks, roles and resources. The operationalisation of EU 
counter-terrorism law and policy may (and frequently does) require leadership from an EU agency 
for example (as was the case with the development of MARSUR) and may create new roles (such 
as the EU counter-terrorism coordinator considered above). So too may it result in either 
harmonisation or fragmentation of frameworks and systems used for particular purposes within the 
EU.  
Thus, from an operational perspective impact might be understood as the effect of operationalising 
a measure on the institutional frameworks, roles, and resources when effect is understood as an 
empirical matter capable of measurement. 
Operational perspectives on legitimacy may be connected to both process and output legitimacy, 
although output legitimacy seems likely to be of particular concern at national level. In terms of 
process legitimacy, the extent to which the creation of an EU counter-terrorist law or policy that 
must then be operationalised has been generated in appreciation of an existing need—as opposed 
to as a political matter—is likely to be taken into account when its legitimacy is being assessed by 
an operationalising entity. This is at least partially because, where the policy is created through a 
particularly political forum such as the Council, it is likely to be especially vague in its nature 
requiring substantial innovation and resource allocation by European and/or national authorities in 
order for operationalisation to take place. In other words, the degree to which the process of 
translation is onerous or challenging may be influenced by the process by which the measure or 
policy was generated. In contrast, regardless of the process by which the measure of policy was 
generated there is likely to be a concern with output legitimacy which, in turn, may address the 
workability of the measures required or obligations imposed. This is arguably connected to the 
extent to which the measure(s) answer general operational needs such as clarity of obligation, 
non-duplication, incentivisation of cooperation and coordination, and information sharing, which in 
turn may be enhanced by ensuring the participation of operational actors in the process of 
generating the measure/policy/output in the first place.  
Thus, from an operational perspective legitimacy might be understood as referring to the 
workability of the measure/policy/obligation when seen from the perspective of the entity or entities 
required to operationalise it, where the extent to which operational needs are addressed is taken 
into account thus embracing both process legitimacy (in terms of participation and the taking 
account of operational perspectives) and output legitimacy. 
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Finally, from an operational perspective effectiveness appears to be connected with the extent to 
which the objective that was to be achieved by means of introducing the measure or policy has 
actually been achieved. Effectiveness here seems, thus, to be a non-abstract matter; rather it is 
measurable. However, this requires that a clear rationale for the measure or policy in question 
ought to have been outlined; one the satisfaction of which can in fact be assessed in a meaningful 
way. In addition, it requires there to be a way of measuring this effectiveness, most likely by means 
of a monitoring mechanism. As outlined in D2.3, EU counter-terrorist measures frequently lack 
built-in monitoring mechanisms and, where they do exist, these mechanisms are not always in fact 
given effect. Monitoring effectiveness from an operational perspective can happen at the level and 
instigation of the operationalising entities, or be structured into new institutions and frameworks 
that might be created in the course of operationalisation, and there is the potential for these to 
provide a discrete picture of whether the measure of policy is achieving its original objective at that 
level but will not necessarily provide an overview on effectiveness at the EU-level.  
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgment 
Lieutenant Commander Erika Downing would like to thank the Naval Service personnel who 
contributed to our understanding of the operations reflected in the case study. 
  
Thus, from an operational perspective effectiveness might be understood as the satisfaction at 
operational level(s) of the original objectives that were to be achieved by the introduction of the 
EU policy or measure. 
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ANNEX  Glossary of Terms 
NS   Naval Service 
SME   Subject Matter Expert 
CT   Counter Terrorism 
EDA   European Defence Agency 
MARSUR  Maritime Surveillance Networking 
RMP   Recognised Maritime Picture  
AIS  Automatic Identification System   
VMS   Vessel Monitoring System 
CSDP   Common Security and Defence Policy 
EMSA   The European Maritime Safety Agency 
CISE   Common information Sharing Environment 
  
 European 
Commission 
DG Home DG Justice 
European Council 
The Council of 
Ministers 
Council Secretariat 
EU Counter-
Terrorism 
Coordinator 
Political and 
Security 
Committee 
COREPER 
General Affairs 
The Security 
Committee 
Foreign Affairs 
Working Party on 
Terrorism (COTER) 
Working Party of 
Foreign Relations 
Counsellors 
WP on the 
Application of 
Specific Measures 
to Combat 
Terrorism 
(CP 931 WP) 
Justice and Home 
Affairs 
CATS 
Terrorism Working 
Group 
Working Party on 
Civil Protection  
(PROCIV) 
Strategic 
Committee on 
Immigration, 
Frontiers and 
Asylum (SCIFA) 
COSI 
European 
Parliament 
LIBE Committee 
Committee on 
Foreign Affairs 
European Agencies 
Europol 
Eurojust 
Frontex 
European Defence 
Agency 
Outside of the EU 
structure 
The Counter-
Terrorism Group 
European Police 
Chiefs' Task Force 
The Police Working 
Group on 
Terrorism 
Contact Group 
(Network of focal 
points) 
